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Abstract
Which divisions of the world can be drawn based on subjective, objective
and normative visions? Do these divisions ﬁt together? Is the EU always
involved in the same region of the world? If yes, which neighbouring places
belong to the same region as the EU?
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Résumé
Ce working paper issu du projet EuroBroadMap cherche à répondre aux
questions suivantes : quelles divisions du monde peut-on produire en se bas-
ant sur des visions subjectives, normatives et fonctionnelles ? Ces partitions
se recoupent-elles ? L'Union européenne apparait-elle toujours dans le même
ensemble?
Mots clés : Monde, régionalisation, Union européenne
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Introduction
We aim to focus this deliverable on the spatial dimension of world divisions
and to elaborate a synthesis of similarities and diﬀerences between world
maps drawn from the mental, functional and political surveys carried out in
the framework of the EuroBroadMap project. We will then try to answer
the following questions:
• Which divisions of the world can be drawn based on subjective, objec-
tive and normative visions?
• Are these divisions consistent with each other?
• Is the EU always included in the same region of the world?
• If yes, what are the neighbouring places that belong to the same region
as the EU?
The concept of `region' is ambiguous because there are several types of
deﬁnition of the concept of regions. Either a region is a mental spatial
representation (Frémont, 1976; Gould and White, 1997) or it is a social
construction based on (i) the growing exchanges and interactions between
contiguous territories (functional region) (Balassa, 1961; Baldwin, 1997), (ii)
the combination of certain of economic, social, political and natural charac-
ters (homogeneous region) whatever its size, or (iii) the attraction of a central
place (polarised region. Thanks to this ambiguity, the concept of region is
convenient because it can be applied at diﬀerent scales, from the local to the
global. As such, regions cannot be taken for granted. They are not given
once for all. Regionalisation is by deﬁnition an ongoing multifaceted pro-
cess. It cannot be addressed without considering the time dimension. The
limits of these regions are fuzzy and unstable over time. Consequently, in
this report the study of world regionalisation spans a period of almost 30
years divided into three sub-periods.
The ﬁrst sub-period starts in the 1980s, precisely at the moment when
the global economy shifts from internationalisation and multinationalisation
to globalisation (Michalet, 2004). In addition, this moment is marked by
the end of the Cold War, which symbolises the end of antagonistic blocks.
It is also the moment when the closed regionalism (i.e., the construction
of multinational blocks closed by common tariﬀ barriers) that emerged af-
ter the Second World War is progressively replaced by an open regionalism.
This paves the way to a process of regional integration, namely the fusion of
national economies in large integrated ensembles (macroregions) with com-
mon norms, common economic spaces and common policies (Gemdev, 1999).
Open regionalism aims at better integrating national economies into glob-
alisation and it is viewed by some analysts as an eﬃcient transitional step
for national economies before they can be fully embedded in globalisation,
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as characterised by full and highly challenging multilateralism (Newfarmer,
2005, Mashayeki and Ito, 2005).
The second sub-period (1995-1999) is marked by several economic and
political dynamics: the acceleration of the transition of former communist
countries to liberalism, the rapidly increasing number of regional agreements
notiﬁed to the WTO and the extension of the scope of regional agreements
from economic - ﬁrst and foremost trade - to political issues.
The third sub-period (2005-2009) is marked by the emergence of a poly-
centric world from an economic point of view with the relative economic
decline of the US and EU and the arrival of rapidly emerging economies on
the global stage. The multinational and international patterns of the world
economy are not replaced by globalisation, but move alongside it, especially
because of rapidly growing ﬁnancial ﬂows. This process is combined with
a political one: emerging countries are more and more claiming a new dis-
tribution of power at the global scale and a more balanced relation with
old powers. In this context, it is relevant to take into consideration their
representations of the world.
In the ﬁrst section, we propose taking into account three types of re-
gionalisation in the contemporary period (2005-2009) using a comparative
approach between the mental representation, functional regionalisation and
political regionalisation of the world with a special view on several topics
such as trade ﬂows, traﬃc of air passengers, mental divisions of the world,
diplomatic networks and the geographical distribution of votes at the UN
General Assembly (UNGA). The second section proposes a focus on mental
maps at a world scale based on the analysis of question C of the WP2 ques-
tionnaire on representations of the world. It explores the fuzzy dimension
of mental maps. In the last section, the selected topics are combined in a
historical approach of the regionalisation of the world from the perspective
of relations with the European core.
1 Comparative approach of global regionalisation
(2005-2009)
The objective of this part is to apply a comparative approach of global
regionalisation between the mental, functional and political divisions of the
world. The methodology chosen allows us to make a comparison between the
divisions of the world, even if the data matrixes are diﬀerent. The principle
is to apply a systematic method of partitioning according to the correlation
of residual ﬂows or linkages.
Mental divisions are represented by the number of co-memberships of
countries to the same regions of the world, produced by students surveyed
in 18 countries.
Functional divisions, which represents the growing exchanges and inter-
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actions, are evaluated with two matrixes: bilateral trade ﬂows in 2006 and
air ﬂows between countries in 2008.
Political divisions are evaluated by linkages between countries at an em-
bassy level (considering that consulates or other forms of representation are
assimilated to a lack of linkage) and the common vote at the UNGA in
2005-2007 (60th and 61st sessions).
1.1 Methodology for comparative subsets
The MaxCor algorithm
In order to obtain comparable results, we have decided to apply the sys-
tematic method of partitioning (MaxCor2) elaborated by Claude Grasland
(CNRS) and presented in the ﬁnal report of Work Package 5. The aim of
this method is to produce clusters of countries in a systematic way (two,
four, eight groups) according to the correlation of residual ﬂows or linkages.
More precisely, the method explores relations between countries that are
non-randomly distributed, according to a double constraint model of ori-
gins and destinations, but without the addition of external variables from
the matrix of ﬂows. Size eﬀects are controlled but distance eﬀects are not,
which means that countries that are spatially close have a good probability
of clustering together and producing `regions'. However, it is important to
keep in mind that MaxCor2 focuses on equivalence criteria rather than on
cohesion criteria. It means that countries that are clustered together are
not necessarily characterised by direct bilateral links but rather by common
patterns of preferential links and barriers with other countries in the world.
We have decided to choose equivalence criteria in order to put together not
only regions based on cliques with strong internal links (e.g. the trade ﬂows
between countries of Western Europe) but also countries that are not related
by direct links but indirect ones with the same destinations (e.g. the coun-
tries of northern Africa are equivalent in terms of trade because of sharing a
common exchange with Western Europe). To clarify this point, we propose
a theoretical example where diﬀerent possibilities of clustering are possible
in order to demonstrate that the MaxCor2 method is able to capture the
two types of regions within a single model.
A theoretical example of application on a simulated world
We have built a matrix that is a simulation of the contemporary world with
three groups of core countries surrounded by peripheries (A, B, C). Each
core is characterised by strong internal exchanges (e.g. a high level of ﬂows
between A1, A2 and A3) and exclusive relations with dominated countries
that are located in their neighbourhoods. Core countries exchange together
but not with peripheries that are only related to one set of core countries
(e.g. the main ﬂows of a1, a2 and a3 are mainly directed to A1, A2 and A3).
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In order to introduce some complexity, we have also introduced a speciﬁc set
of countries (D) that are characterised by homogeneous exchanges with all
countries in the world. This group can illustrate the situation of countries
that are energy or raw material producers such as those in the Persian Gulf.
As can be seen in Figure 1, the MaxCor algorithm ﬁrstly evaluates what
should be the theoretical ﬂows in a ﬂat world where all countries exchange
with all other countries according to their sole capacity of import and ex-
port (STEP1). The diﬀerence between these observed and theoretical ﬂows
reveals the preferences between countries that exchange more than expected
(STEP2). The correlation between residual ﬂows reveals similarities be-
tween countries characterised by the same structure of preferential relations
(STEP3). Finally, we use the standard algorithm CONCOR, which multi-
plies the correlation matrix by itself until all cells are equal to -1 and +1,
which deﬁnes a partition into two groups (STEP4). Each subgroup can be
further divided into two following the same algorithm in order to obtain four
groups (STEP5) and so on.
Validation of the algorithm of partitioning
We now examine if the ﬁnal partition in eight classes ﬁts with the initial
assumptions introduced in our simulated example of the contemporary world
(Figure 2).
The answer is clearly positive and we can recognise that the procedure
has been able, with very few exceptions, to reveal all the expected groups of
core countries (A, B, C), peripheries (a, b, c) and energy-producing countries
connected to all the world (d). The procedure seems, therefore, to be suc-
cessful for the objective of the research, namely grouping the world based on
ﬂows, taking into account the geopolitical situations of countries in terms of
core, peripheries and speciﬁc areas connected to the rest of the world because
of speciﬁc advantages. It is nevertheless important to notice some properties
of the algorithm before applying it to real situations.
The diﬀerent levels of partitioning (in two, four and eight classes) should
be analysed together as they reveal diﬀerent dimensions of the phenomenon.
In our example, the partition in two classes ﬁrstly revealed a clear division
between core countries linked by preferential ﬂows and peripheries charac-
terised by the weakness of their internal exchanges. The partition in four
classes revealed the opposition between two opposite cores (A and B+C) but
also the speciﬁcity of energy producers inside the periphery. It is only at the
level of eight classes that diﬀerences between peripheral areas are displayed
and that division between core B and core C is revealed.
The binary division in two, four and eight classes introduces artiﬁcial
divisions in clusters when the reality ﬁts better to other clusters. In our
example, the separation of country A1 from cluster A or country d6 from
cluster d is certainly an artefact and the better partition to be found from
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Figure 1: Application of the MaxCor algorithm on a theoretical example
Step O: Observed ﬂows (Fij) Step 1: Estimated ﬂows (F ∗ ij)
Step 2: Residual ﬂows (Fij − F ∗ ij) Step 3: Correlation of residual ﬂows (Rij)
Step 4: Partition in two groups Step 5: Partition in four groups
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Figure 2: Evaluation of results obtained against the initial assumption
Expected forms of clustering Final partition in eight clusters
an empirical point of view is probably a division into six classes.
Indirect dependences between countries are revealed by the algorithm
CONCOR that are not directly visible on the correlation matrix. The eleva-
tion of the correlation matrix to successive power values stress connections
between countries that are linked by relatively long paths of indirect links.
This property is important because large-scale organisations show increas-
ing levels of local heterogeneity and global interdependency, which means
that the channel of the propagation of innovations or economic crisis can-
not be measured without an algorithm able to simulate complex patterns of
diﬀusion (Serrano, Boguñá and Vespignani, 2007).
1.2 Mental divisions of the world in 2009
Data on mental divisions of the world
For this part, data are available for 2009, when the EuroBroadMap survey
took place. We use the divisions of the world in regions produced by students
of 18 countries that has been transferred into a GIS application by Nicolas
Lambert. For each country of the world, we have chosen a characteristic
point, which is the location of the capital. Then, we have computed for each
polygon (region) drawn by a student the number of capitals that are located
inside and we derive from the matrix [PC] polygon*countries the number
of the co-memberships of countries to the same regions of the world. In
mathematical terms, the result is the Country*Country matrix [CC] which
is the cross-product of the matrix [PC] and its transposition. To be sure, a
ﬁgure of '2500' for France and Greece means that 2500 students have put
these countries in the same region of the world.
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Of course, this matrix of the co-memberships of countries to the same
world regions is a very simple and rough approximation of the mental maps
drawn by students. Many improvements are possible, for example by choos-
ing several control points in each country (not only the capital) or by intro-
ducing more sophisticated weighting patterns (by comparing the results for
students of diﬀerent countries and diﬀerent places of the survey).
The general pattern of the structural equivalence of mental representa-
tion is a `continental' world vision, because ﬁve sets of countries characterised
by common preferences are easy to identify on the matrix of the correlation
of residual co-membership values (Figure 3). For the students, African coun-
tries are, for example, clearly connected together, which is obviously related
to `cultural identity', but also to the clear `geographical' shape of this part
of the world. Africa is represented clearly as an `entity'. Other examples
concern Europe, Asia, Paciﬁca and Central and South America, which are
connected in the mental representations of students. This continental vision
can be explained by the inﬂuence of school programs (see WP4) and interna-
tional organisations (Olympic Games), which contribute to formalise mental
minds. The limits of the integrated network are not always clear and we can
observe interesting positions for two countries, Canada and the US, which
are not core in the minds of students. These countries are shared between
two major mental structures, namely America on one hand and the North
on the other hand, when students decided to divide the world in two parts:
North and South.
1.3 Functional divisions of the world in 2007-2008
Data for functional divisions of the world
After the examination of the previous set of data used by EuroBroadMap
project in WP5, we have decided to focus on the matrix of bilateral trade
ﬂows in 2006. This ﬁrst matrix of functional relation has been completed
by a matrix of air ﬂows between countries in 2008 elaborated by IGEAT (F.
Dobruszkes) on the base of OAG data but not used until now in the project.
The air ﬂows are measured initially as a number of planes between airports
for January 2008. These reﬂect only the supply made by airlines and not
on the demand because we have no information on the aircraft occupation,
and the origins and ﬁnal destinations of travellers are unknown. The initial
matrix from airport to airport has been aggregated here at a country level.
Divisions of the world by trade ﬂows in 2007
The general pattern of the structural equivalence of bilateral trade ﬂows is
complex and does not reveal obvious clusters of countries, even if some sets of
countries characterised by common preferences and barriers are easy to iden-
tify on the matrix of the correlation of residual ﬂows (Figure 4). EU member
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Figure 3: Division of the world according to mental representation in 2009
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States are, for example, clearly connected together. This is obviously related
to preferential trade agreement, the importance of historical links including
at the level of ﬁrms and the low cost of transportation induced by short
distances. However, the limits of this integrated network are not clear and
we can observe two branches of connections directed on the one hand toward
the East (former Soviet Union and Turkey) and toward the South (Maghreb
and Western Africa). Switzerland, Norway and Western Balkan countries
are clearly associated to the EU cluster in terms of trade, but some member
states seem to be relatively weakly correlated, in particular Baltic countries
and Finland, which are strongly related to Russia in relative terms, but also
Ireland, which is characterised by preferential relations with the US.
The partition of the world obtained using the MaxCor2 algorithm con-
ﬁrms the previous observation and reveals the existence of diﬀerent levels
of trade integration around the core of Western Europe. The partition in
two groups is a global opposition between a great Euro-African area (includ-
ing Russia and Central Asia) and the rest of the world. The partition in
four groups introduces a clear separation between the Euro-Mediterranean
area and the majority of countries of sub-Saharan Africa that are less in-
tegrated with Western Europe and more connected together (South-East
Africa) and with the rest of the world (increasing trade ﬂows with China,
the US, Brazil and Japan). Finally, the partition in eight groups divides the
Euro-Mediterranean area into two separate clusters according to a line that
is more or less equivalent to the former Iron Curtain that separated Europe
before 1989. The Western part is typically characterised by a strong polari-
sation of ﬂows toward France, the UK, Spain and Italy and the Eastern part
by preferential trade relations with Russia and Germany.
In conclusion, the analysis of trade ﬂows reveals an area of integration
that is at the same time larger than the EU, but deeply divided between East
and West. The Mediterranean Sea cannot be considered as a discontinuity
according to this criterion.
Divisions of the world according to air connections in 2008
The general pattern of the structural equivalence of air connections is fun-
damentally dual and reveals a strong opposition between what is classically
called the New World (Northern and Southern Americas) and the Old World
(Africa, Europe and Asia) in the textbooks of history and geography. Inside
each of these world regions, we can observe very strong clusters of countries
characterised by high levels of correlation of their preferential air connections
and less intermediate situations than in the case of trade. The reason for this
stronger organisation of air ﬂows is related to the concentration of air ﬂows
around major hubs located in a limited number of global airports (Paris,
London, Frankfurt, Zürich, Amsterdam, New York, Los Angeles, Singapore,
Hong Kong, Tokyo) with a second level of polarisation with more specialised
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Figure 4: Division of the world according to bilateral trade ﬂows in 2007
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airports at a more regional scale (Moscow, Dubai, Miami, Madrid, Cape
Town, Vienna). Many countries are thus strongly dependent on one or two
major hubs located in external countries for their global relations with the
rest of the world, which explains why they seem to be strongly correlated.
Moreover, the major hubs are also organised into clusters that ﬁt with the
classical organisation of the world in a Triad (Northern America, Western
Europe, Eastern Asia) but also with the pattern of new emerging poles (the
Persian Gulf, Southern America, Southern Africa, Oceania).
The partition of the world obtained from air ﬂow analysis (Figure 5) is
similar to the one revealed from trade analysis. Indeed, the division of the
world into two clusters reveals one more time a Euro-Mediterranean area
enlarged to include the former Soviet Union but exclude Persian Gulf coun-
tries and the majority of Sub-Saharan Africa. The partition in four clusters
reveals the opposition between two major areas of air connections in America
and the Euro-Mediterranean, but also an emerging area including Southern
and Eastern Asia, Oceania and the Persian Gulf. Japan is an interesting
exception as it is involved in the American cluster and separated from the
rest of Asia1. The partition in eight groups reveals the particular case of
Sub-Saharan Africa, which is more and more an area of shared inﬂuence of
the three major poles of the world economy. Inside the Euro-Mediterranean
area, we observe one more time a clear division between a Western part
(polarised by the airports of London, Paris, Amsterdam and Zürich) and an
Eastern part more connected to the airports of Germany, Austria, Russia
and Scandinavian countries. Both areas are divided clearly into centres and
peripheries.
In conclusion, the analysis of air ﬂows reveals, as in the case of trade
ﬂows, an area of integration which is at the same time larger than the EU and
deeply divided between East and West. The diﬀerence is that the Southern
bank of the Mediterranean Sea remains strongly related to Europe but not
to Sub-Saharan Africa.
1.4 Diplomatic division of the world
Data on the diplomatic divisions of the world
Concerning diplomatic networks, we have decided to use the network of
embassies provided by the Correlates of War Diplomatic Exchange database
2. We have used a simpliﬁed version of the diplomatic relation and we
1The explanation is related to the fact that most Asian countries are characterised by
preferential air connections with Japan, which is obviously not possible for Japan itself
as internal air ﬂows are not taken into account. The preferential air relations of Japan
are therefore with the US, which justiﬁes its correlation with other Northern American
countries such as Canada or Mexico.
2The Correlates of War Diplomatic Exchange data set captures diplomatic represen-
tation at the level of chargé d'aﬀaires, minister, and ambassador between members of the
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Figure 5: Division of the world according to air ﬂows in 2008
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consider only the linkages between countries at an embassy level (considering
therefore that consulates or other forms of representation are assimilated to
a lack of linkages). In order to complete the diplomatic networks, we have
used another criterion, namely the number of common votes at the UNGA
in 2005-2006 (60th and 61st sessions). This database was created by Laurent
Beauguitte, manager and researcher of the EuroBroadMap Project.
Divisions of the world according to the embassies network in 2005
The general pattern of the structural equivalence of the embassies network
deﬁnes a ring of strongly connected countries on the general basis of ge-
ographical proximity. The graph of correlation is indeed very close to a
geographical map of the world seen from the North Pole and this situation
can be easily explained by the necessity for all countries to develop ﬁrstly
diplomatic relations with their immediate neighbours. War and conﬂicts
can, of course, introduce temporary exceptions, but in general the countries
with limited resources will develop ﬁrstly diplomatic relations with the ma-
jor world players (G20 countries) and with the countries located at short
distances away and those sharing a common terrestrial or maritime border.
In terms of correlation, the development of relations with major countries
such as the US, France, the UK, Russia, Brazil or China is not speciﬁc and
the connections with neighbourhoods are those that contribute the most to
the deﬁnition of preferential relations and correlations presented in Figure
5.1. Speciﬁcities are sometimes inherited from history such as diplomatic
links between the former countries of the socialist bloc or colonial links of
African countries with France and the UK. Current geopolitical position can
also produce diﬀerences, with the typical examples of the presence or lack of
embassies in countries such as Iran, Israel, Kosovo or North Korea3.
The partition of the world obtained with the MaxCor2 algorithm for the
embassies network (Figure 6) is clearly diﬀerent from the one that had been
revealed by the functional criteria of trade and air ﬂows. Indeed, the ﬁrst
division in two groups seems to be an opposition between old and rich in-
dustrial countries and poor and emerging countries. In this division of the
world, the historical links developed between Europe and America on both
sides of the Atlantic Ocean are clearly visible, as well as connections estab-
lished with industrialised countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan
or South Korea. Further divisions in four and eight clusters introduce re-
gional diﬀerentiations based on geographical proximity but connections at
Correlates of War interstate system. Reference: Bayer Resat. 2006. `Diplomatic Exchange
Data set, v2006.1.' Online: http://correlatesofwar.org.
3It is important to observe that the countries with the most important diplomatic
networks (France, the US, the UK, China, Japan, Germany, Canada, India) are less cor-
related with the other countries of the world because they have precisely no real regional
speciﬁcities but are also not precisely similar each other. Their allocation to a particular
group is therefore not very relevant.
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long distance remain visible, for example in the case of Spain/Latin America
countries because of their strong historical links. An interesting division can
be observed in Africa between a Northwestern part, which is still strongly
connected to Europe, in particular through French networks, and a South-
eastern part that was historically more related to the UK but which has
more connections with East Asia.
In conclusion, the analysis of the embassies network reveals an important
level of association between rich EU countries, America and most developed
countries of the Western Paciﬁc area. The Mediterranean Sea seems this
time to be a signiﬁcant discontinuity even if part of Africa remains linked to
the EU.
1.5 Divisions of the world according to the vote of resolution
at the UNGA in 2005-2007
The general pattern of the structural equivalence of votes at the UNGA de-
ﬁnes an almost perfect division of between Western countries and the rest
of the World. Even if this ﬁrst result is well known by researchers in po-
litical science (Holloway and Tomlinson, 1995; Voeten, 2000), it deserves a
more in-depth analysis of the border countries (located on the limits of the
two main blocks) and the internal diﬀerentiations of each block (that can-
not be immediately perceived on the initial ﬁgure). Concerning the border
countries, the cases of Russia and Argentina are particularly interesting be-
cause they reveal indirect connections between the EU respectively with the
former Soviet Union and Latin America. Both countries are characterised
by an ambiguous perception of their relation with the EU associated with
strong historical linkages. This linkage is related to past migrations in the
case of Argentina (see the Analysis of the perception of the EU in Argentina
in the WP3 report) and to geopolitical alliance and conﬂicts with Western
European states from the 16th to the 20th centuries in the case of Russia
and the former USSR. From this point of view, it is interesting to observe
that Turkey, which presents the same historical ambiguity in its relation with
Western Europe, is clearly involved in the Western group of countries and
is therefore characterised until now by a clear assimilation to this block in
terms of the vote of resolution at the UNGA. The same is true for Baltic
countries, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia, but not for other former republics
of the Soviet Union that deﬁne a transition group mostly located on the
non-Western side. This probably highlights the importance of NATO as a
military organisation that spatially extends beyond the EU toward Turkey
and some former USSR countries. Azerbaijan and Belarus are, for exam-
ple, located in this transition group with countries of Central Asia such as
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
The partition of the world obtained using the MaxCor2 algorithm for
the UNGA vote (Figure 7) reveals ﬁrstly the trivial and expected opposition
16
Figure 6: Division of the world according to the embassies network in 2005
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between Western countries and the rest of the world but it helps also point
out the original situation of some border countries that cannot be fully as-
similated to one block. As well as the cases of Argentina and Russia, we can
observe speciﬁc situations for countries of Central and Eastern Africa that
present an original pattern of vote at the UNGA. This originality is some-
times related to partial alliances with former European colonisers, as in the
case of Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon and the Central African Republic, obviously
subject to an inﬂuence of French diplomatic and economic networks. But it
can also be related to a genuine originality as in the case of Cameroon or
Democratic Republic of Congo. It is ﬁnally worth noting that the correla-
tion method has revealed the proximity of the US and Israel to the Western
group, despite the fact that these countries are characterised by a strong
isolation on the majority of resolutions4.
In conclusion, the analysis of common votes at the UNGA reveals a strong
dichotomy between Western countries and the rest of the world. From this
point of view, Europe is clearly member of a club of rich countries, symbolised
by memberships to organisation such as the OECD or NATO among others.
1.6 Synthesis: correlation between the divisions of the world
The analysis of each of the previous criteria revealed some similarities but
also diﬀerences between the world regions. A European region emerged in all
analyses but its shape was not always the same. It can include Russia (mental
divisions) or not (embassies network). It can include North American and
Australia (vote at the UNGA) or some northern African countries (air ﬂows).
Moreover, the division between Western and Eastern Europe can appear or
not, and when it appears the countries included in each area can vary: the air
ﬂows world division draws a quite small Western Europe, whereas the vote
at the UNGA includes all Eastern European countries excluding Belarus and
Russia. Of course, the nature of the ﬂows are diﬀerent and some of them are
real (trade, air ﬂows) and others virtual or symbolic (vote at the UNGA).
A quantitative appreciation of the resemblance between the divisions of the
world can be obtained through a measure of the correlation between each
criterion (Figure 8). The strongest correlation obtained can be observed
between the two functional criteria (trade and air ﬂows), which are both real
ﬂows whose spatial organisations can be inﬂuenced by similar factors such
as distance. One of the lowest correlations can be observed between the
embassies network and voting behaviour at the UNGA. If both criteria were
chosen to reﬂect diplomatic ﬂows, their natures would be quite diﬀerent.
Embassies reﬂect bilateral relations and this can be inﬂuenced by historical
links, whereas votes at the UNGA reﬂect countries' positions on the main
issues of the world scene. As far as mental divisions are concerned, they
4Correlation is indeed not based on the mean value of common vote but on the similarity
of patterns with other countries.
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Figure 7: Division of the world according to common votes at the UNGA in
2005-2007
19
Figure 8: Correlation between mental, functional and diplomatic divisions
of the world in 2005-2009
seemed to be clearly correlated with air ﬂows and the embassies network but
less with world divisions based on trade and votes at the UNGA. Indeed, the
mental division follows continental patterns, which can also be observed to
a certain extent with the embassies network and air ﬂows.
The pattern obtained through the combination all previous criteria (Fig-
ure 9) shows a global division of the world into four obvious regions (`Amer-
ican', `European', `Asian' and `African'), thus stressing the inﬂuence of the
continental organisation of ﬂows and continental representation of the world.
But, what is more interesting is to focus on the `in between' countries that
cannot be easily related to one single region, because their connections are
diﬀerent from one criterion to another one. Most of those `in between' coun-
tries are located along the southern border of the `European' region such
as Tunisia, Malta, Cyprus, Georgia and Kazakhstan. Other cases are more
political than geographical, such as the US and Canada, which are typically
in an `in between' situation characterised by strong functional links with the
rest of the `American' region but important diplomatic links with the ma-
jority of the countries in the `European' region. These in between countries
are characterised by speciﬁc positions in functional, political and diplomatic
ﬂows but also by some hesitations in drawing world regions as far as the
mental divisions of the world are concerned. This implies that we should
explore more in detail this speciﬁc position, at least in one criterion, the
mental division of the world.
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Figure 9: Synthesis of world division in 2005-2009 according to mental, func-
tional and diplomatic criteria.
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2 Borders in mental regionalisation
In this part, we choose to focus on the mental regionalisation of the world
more precisely on the question of the existence of a European region. In case
this European region emerges in the mental world region pattern, we examine
its shape and its position in the world. We ﬁrst analyse how the countries are
grouped into world regions. We focus then on the core areas of the regions
drawn by the students and the areas that overlap. From this perspective, we
pay special attention to the European core and its fuzzy borders. In the last
part, we focus on the European border in order to explore the complexity of
the mental reorientation of European borders.
These analyses are mainly conducted with data obtained from the survey
on the mental maps of students, particularly part C of the questionnaire
on world maps, where students were invited to draw up their own world
regionalisation (15 regions maximum). The information has been reduced
to the country level thanks to a co-belonging matrix: for each country, we
counted the number of times it was placed in the same region as all other
world countries.
2.1 Hierarchical process of the mental divisions of the world
Focusing on mental regionalisation, we have chosen to analyse how countries
were grouped thanks to a hierarchical classiﬁcation applied on the world
regions co-belonging matrix (Didelon, 2005). Seven steps of classes are rep-
resented here (Figure 10), even if the most signiﬁcant are the divisions in
the ﬁfth and seventh classes. This helps decompose visually the building of
world regions, allowing us to observe the world division at each step. The
main objective is to understand how countries are grouped together and to
determine the main regions drawn by the students. In the last step, these
seven classes are drawn and we give them the names of the central object,
in order to avoid misinterpreting the world regions.
In the ﬁrst step of the classiﬁcation, the division of the world into two
regions shows the early isolation of a `Gabon region' from the rest of the
world. As said before, Africa has, to students' eyes, a coherent geographical
shape that helps deﬁne it without hesitation as a world region. Moreover,
other parts of the world are sometimes grouped into regions that do not
include African countries: developed countries, Eurasia etc.
The second step shows the isolation of a `Denmark region' that includes
Russia but neither Island nor Greenland, and that corresponds quite well
to some classical deﬁnitions of Europe (from Brest to Vladivostok). The
following steps show the divisions of the rest of the `old Eurasian' part of
the world in three regions (`Iraq', `Northern Marianna' and `Bangladesh')
and the splitting of the `new world' into two pieces (`St Vincent and the
Grenadines' and `Bahamas').
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To summarise, the division of the world obtained in the last stage shows
that students have mainly a continental vision of the world, as the main
objects formed can be named with the classical names of the continents. One
exception is the `Iraq' region, which is not an historical continent but rather
one of the classical subdivisions of `Asia'. However, this part of the world
emerged clearly in the representation during the XXth century in a rather
geopolitical context (Capdepuy, 2008, 2009). Even though some diﬀerences
exist (Turkey not included in the `Denmark' region and diﬀerent patterns
of division between the northern and southern part of the Americas), the
results are quite similar to those obtained in 2005 from quite diﬀerent public
surveys (geographers and spatial planners involved in the ESPON program)
(Didelon, 2005). Indeed the survey, conducted four years later on young
students, shows how much the vision of the world is constituted of the stable
objects mainly built on the continental division of the world (Grataloup,
2010). However, the mental divisions of the world are blurred or fuzzy and
it is worth exploring in more detail the shapes of the regions' limits.
2.2 Extension of fuzzy regions
Based on the previous hierarchical classiﬁcation of mental regions, we ex-
plore the countries grouped together in the same class and check how fuzzy
or well deﬁned these diﬀerent regions are. If the regions formed in the pre-
vious classiﬁcation seem quite well deﬁned, some speciﬁc challenges have to
be raised as far as mental maps are concerned. If, as stated by Montello
(2003), the creation of geographical regions is a necessary approach to ef-
fectively organising the knowledge of the world, respondents to the survey
are unlikely to have a precise idea of regions' limits. Regions are merely
deﬁned in terms of their visual structure, of speciﬁc activity, of ethnic com-
position and of other characteristics that are not strictly related to spatial
cognition (Kuipers, 1978) and are built using and mixing various sources of
information (Friedman, 2009; Battersby and Montello, 2009). We consider
therefore that it is diﬃcult, if not impossible, to deﬁne a world region as
the sum of the spatial elements belonging to it without ambiguity. Thus,
we have to deﬁne the region as a `fuzzy space' (Zadeh, 1965; Rolland-May,
2003). From this perspective, fuzzy set theory is of great help to formalise
the subjectivity, uncertainty and imprecision according to human perception
(Bouchon-Meunier, 1995) and help deal with poorly deﬁned regions.
In order to catch how many regions obtained from our analysis are fuzzy,
we calculate a distance measured based on the `probability' between each
country of the world and the central object of each class (Bouchon-Meunier,
1995). The collection of maps below (Figure 11) shows the probability level
of each country of the world belonging to all the classes obtained from the
world regionalisation. Some observations have to be made:
• All countries of the world have at least a low probability of belonging to
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Figure 10: Hierarchical process of the mental divisions of the world
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each region: the minimum probability value for all maps is 3.84 (even
though the colour on the map is white for visualisation purposes). For
example, the Cook Islands in the South Paciﬁc have a minimum of
12.28 probability of belonging to the `Gabon area' and a maximum of
17.29 of belonging to the `Northern Marianna Islands' area.
• The maximum value of the probability of belonging to a region is re-
tained by Gabon, precisely for the `Gabon area'. This value is not so
high and this lets us understand that this country can be included in
other world regions. Thus, if Gabon is the central object of the class
formed by African countries, it does not mean that African countries
are always grouped together or cannot be included in another world
region.
Those two observations can be explained by the fact that even the re-
gional ﬁgures we obtained are similar to a certain extent to the continental
vision of the world; some students did not follow this way of representation.
Some made `north' and `south' regions, `rich' and `poor', `exploited' and `ex-
ploiter' or even `one world region'. Therefore, the classiﬁcation presented
before is a summary of the world regions drawn by students but makes us
lose some information on the least frequent world mental regionalisation.
The maps of the probabilities allow us to identify some `core' regions
(dark colours), fuzzy border regions and even fuzzy regions where even the
highest values are low. In the group of `core' world regions, we can identity
ﬁrst the `Gabon area', a group of all African countries in dark red, except for
some few northern African countries. This core group is the largest we can
observe and matches nearly perfectly with the classic `African continent'.
Other core regions do not cover all the regions formed by the hierarchical
classiﬁcation. For example, in the `Denmark' area, a core can be observed
but it is the smallest of the regions identiﬁed previously. Other regions also
show cores but it should be stressed here that the maximum probability val-
ues for the two ﬁrst regions are not very high in the `Iraq', `Bangladesh',
`St Vincent and Grenadines' and `Bahamas' regions. Then, a last region
seems to be fuzzy in itself - the `South Marianna Island' region, where the
highest value to belonging to this zone is not high. Anyway, nearly all world
regions show fuzzy borders, with decreasing values of probability of belong-
ing. Those regions are more or less large and more or less complex in their
conﬁgurations. For example, the `Denmark' area shows a relatively large
extension of high and medium probabilities of belonging to this area. Russia
and Greenland have signiﬁcant probabilities of belonging to the `Denmark'
area, but so too do Turkey, some countries of the southern Mediterranean
shore (Tunisia, Algeria) and also, more surprisingly, Australia, which should
have been included with European countries in `north' or `west' or `rich'
regions by the students.
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Figure 11: Fuzzy analysis of the mental division of the world in seven regions
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2.3 Overlapping areas in the world
The overlapping regions can be analysed more in detail by calculating speciﬁc
indicators. The probabilistic T-Norm, presented below (Figure 12), is quite
useful to stress the regions that are largely shared between all other world
regions (Zadeh, 1965, Didelon et al., 2011). On the following map, the darker
green regions are those most shared between all world regions drawn by
students. Paciﬁc countries are in this situation, along with Greenland. The
areas of overlapping appear quite well in this map. They cover large parts of
the Eurasian continent shared between Europe, Asia, the Middle East and
Central Asia as well as the northern African countries shared between Africa
and Europe. North American countries seem to be a signiﬁcant interstice
area that could be explained by the fact that the US and Canada often belong
to the `north', `developed' or `exploiter' regions together with Japan and
European countries. All these observations are coherent with the interstice
areas identiﬁed in previous research (Didelon et al., 2011) except in the case
of North America. The places we have identiﬁed as core regions are in light
green such as the sub-Saharan African countries, part of South America and
three European countries: Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark.
A second indicator used here can be considered to be an `index of over-
lapping' (Figure 12) between two regions. It provides an indication of how
much a country has a probability of belonging to two regions with close prob-
abilistic values. For example, the value of overlapping for Australia is high
because it could belong to the `South Marianna Island area' (25.68) and to
the `Denmark area' (16). On the contrary, the Democratic Republic of Congo
value is low because the maximum value (61.5 for the `Gabon area' is much
more important than is the second rank value (10.1 for the `Iraq area'). The
map obtained allows us to stress the countries shared between two world re-
gions. This is the case for the `Iraq region' countries, which appear as a dark
brown colour, as well as Tunisia and Algeria. Three countries of the Iraq
region (Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan) seem mainly shared be-
tween the `Iraq region' and the `Bangladesh region'. Tunisia and, to a lesser
extent, Algeria are shared between the `Denmark' and `Gabon' regions. The
small countries of Central America and the Caribbean (Panama, Dominican
Republic and Puerto Rico) are shared between the `Bahamas' and `St Vin-
cent and the Grenadine Islands' regions. European countries show relatively
low values of indices of overlapping but a focus on a candidate country to
EU membership could be interesting. The index of overlapping of Turkey
is relatively high and this country is shared mainly between the `Denmark'
and `Iraq' regions.
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Figure 12: Overlaps and margins in the mental division of the world in seven
regions
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3 An historical perspective of the regionalisation of
the world from the perspective of relations with
the European Core
In order to take into account a historical perspective of the regionalisation
of the world, we have decided to select data on functional ﬂows and political
linkages that make possible a comparison between all countries of the world
in three periods (see introduction). However, the number of countries avail-
able in the diﬀerent matrices of ﬂows and linkages used in the ﬁrst part of
this report is not the same according to each criteria and (obviously) to each
period. In order to obtain comparable results, it was decided to exclude all
countries that are not available for the four criteria (trade ﬂows, air ﬂows,
embassies, votes at the UNGA) for the last period of 2005-2008. The result
is a selection of 171 countries that deﬁnes the maximum size (171×171) of
the matrix to be used for the research of the divisions of the world. In pre-
vious periods, the number of countries is more limited (e.g. Switzerland was
not a member of the UN in 1995-1996 and is therefore not included in the
matrix of vote at this time). This reduction is especially obvious for the ﬁrst
period where only 140 to 150 countries are generally available. In the case of
countries that existed before 1989 but were divided later, we assume a conti-
nuity of existence with the mainland part (Yugoslavia/Serbia, USSR/Russia,
Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic) but we add the new countries created after
the division (Croatia, Ukraine, Slovakia). In the reverse case of fusion coun-
tries (Yemen and Germany), we exclude from the analysis the countries that
have disappeared because of uniﬁcation (Democratic Republic of Germany,
Democratic Republic of Yemen).
3.1 Methodology for the elaboration of an integrated histor-
ical perspective
Each of the four criteria considered in the previous section reveal the exis-
tence of world regions that cover more or less the territory of the current EU
but with diﬀerent degrees of extension toward eastern and southern neigh-
bourhoods. The question is now to evaluate how these diﬀerent geometries
ﬁt together and which countries are linked to the EU for both functional and
diplomatic criteria and which ones are only associated to the EU on only one
of these two dimensions. This question cannot be answered by the simple
analysis of the contemporary situation; rather, it needs a dynamic perspec-
tive, looking at the combination of criteria in the three diﬀerent periods of
time: in 1985-1986 before the fall of the Iron Curtain and the end of the so-
cialist block; in 1995-1996 when the perspective of the enlargement of the EU
from 15 to 27 produced deep changes in the relations with countries located
in the eastern and southern peripheries; and in 2005-2008 when the process
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of EU enlargement was temporarily achieved and when the growing inﬂuence
of emerging economies (China, India, Brazil, Southern Africa) and possible
renewal of geopolitical Russian inﬂuence introduced strong changes in the
traditional areas of inﬂuence of Western Europe countries, in particular in
Africa and the Middle East.
In order to evaluate these transformations, we have decided to adopt a
more Eurocentric approach by measuring the similarities for each criterion
between the countries of the world and the nine Western European countries
that have been EU members since 19735. In concrete terms, we determine
the median of the nine coeﬃcients of correlation that can be observed and
we consider this median value as a measure of proximity or remoteness to the
Western core of the EU for each of the four criteria (trade ﬂows, air ﬂows,
embassies network and vote at the UNGA). As these criteria are measured
in three diﬀerent periods of time, we build a table with four columns where
each country of the world appears three times (for 1985, 1995 and 2005)
except if this country has disappeared or appeared during the period. We
ﬁnally apply a hierarchical cluster analysis on this table in order to derive
typical situations of relations with the Western European core that can be
compared over time. The cluster analysis reveals the existence of four typical
situations of countries with the EU, which conﬁrms the partial independence
of the functional and diplomatic dimensions:
• Type A: Countries positively correlated to the EU9 in both functional
and diplomatic terms. Of the members of the EU, a good example
of this situation is given by Turkey or Switzerland, which are not cur-
rently members of the EU but which presented during the whole period
of study (1985-2005) all the signs of a full integration with the EU9
as regards their trade exchanges, air ﬂows, diplomatic networks and
voting behaviour at the UNGA6.
• Type B1: Countries positively correlated to the EU9 for functional
relations but negatively for diplomatic criteria. The best example of
this situation is given by the countries of Northern Africa (Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt) that are characterised during the
whole period by preferential trade or air relations with countries of
Western Europe, even if both functional criteria are not always equally
fulﬁlled. These functional linkages are not conﬁrmed by diplomatic
linkages because these countries develop speciﬁc networks of embassies
diﬀerent from the ones of the EU (e.g. case of Israel) and because
5France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Denmark, the United
Kingdom and Ireland.
6In the case of Switzerland, it is of course not possible to evaluate votes at the UN
before its admission to the UN in 2002. Therefore, the level of diplomatic correlation is
evaluated only on embassy networks in 1985 and 1995.
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their patterns of votes at the UNGA make them clearly members of
the `non-Western' block.
• Type B2: Countries positively correlated to the EU9 for diplomatic
criteria but negatively for functional relations. The US, Canada, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan are the most obvious
representatives of this situation during the whole period. Despite their
long distances from Western Europe, they are clearly characterised by
a common pattern of embassies networks and a common attitude con-
cerning votes at the UNGA. However, they are also engaged in other
regional networks when it comes to functional relations measured by
air or trade ﬂows and present therefore the opposite characteristics of
North African countries.
• Type C: Countries negatively correlated with the EU9 in both func-
tional and diplomatic terms. This situation is typically observed in
large emerging countries such as China and Brazil but also more gen-
erally in remote countries with few connections with Europe such as
the Philippines and Indonesia. It can also be observed in countries
that have strong historical links with Europe but are currently more
polarised toward competing cores of Northern America and Eastern
Asia such as Mexico and Saudi Arabia. We are here in the opposite
situation of type A, with countries that are integrated in another world
functional area for trade and air relations and which do not develop the
same patterns of diplomatic relations according to embassies networks
and votes at the UNGA.
We can summarise these four typical situations with a 2×2 table crossing the
levels of political and functional linkages between the EU9 and the countries
of the world. Until now, we have described the stable pattern of the relations
between the EU and other parts of the world. We will now use the same
method and cartographic representations to observe the historical evolutions
of the EU's inﬂuence in the world between 1985 and 2005.
3.2 Western European relations in the world at the end of
the Cold War (1985-1986)
The core of the European region at the end of the Cold War is clearly de-
termined by the political division between socialist and capitalist countries
(Figure 13). The enlargement of the EU to 15 members in 1995 seems to be
the logical consequence of the strong functional and diplomatic integration of
the countries. The exceptions of Norway and Switzerland are only apparent
if we consider that they were candidates and that the proposal to join the EU
was not adopted by the citizens of these countries. The case of Turkey is the
most interesting because such opposition by its citizens does not exist. By
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Figure 13: European world diplomatic and functional linkages in 1985-1991
contrast, it is the opposition of existing EU members that has delayed until
now the adhesion of Turkey for various reasons that are oﬃcially related to
human rights but also and the strong feeling that `Turkey is not European'
despite its obvious association in both functional and diplomatic terms. It
is interesting to note that some African countries also present the dual char-
acteristic of strong correlations with the EU in functional and diplomatic
terms: Côte d'Ivoire, Malawi, Zaire and South Africa. Although these are
not democracies, they are supported by former European colonial powers
and areas of high beneﬁt for West European ﬁrms. From this core, we notice
a wide area of functional integration that covers the major part of Africa, the
Middle East and Central and Southern Asia. Despite political opposition,
strong commercial links still exist with the countries under Soviet inﬂuence
and the colonial ties remains important in other parts of Asia and Africa.
Diplomatic linkages are also important (as they will remain to be) with the
US and other rich OECD countries that are both economic partners and
allied against the Soviet Union. There are ﬁnally very few countries that
can be considered to be poorly linked to the EU at this time: these are
found mainly in South America (with some exceptions such as Chile) and
South-eastern Asia (with the exception of the Indochina peninsula).
As a whole, Europe has a large inﬂuence on the world if we consider
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both functional and diplomatic linkages. This inﬂuence relates largely to
the strong historical links between Western Europe and most of the world.
Despite the weakness of Europe as a political actor during the Cold War,
it remains a major actor in the world because of the dependence of large
regions of the world on the European economy.
3.3 European relations in the world during the period of
reuniﬁcation (1995-1998)
The most important trend of this period was the development of both func-
tional and diplomatic links between Western and Eastern Europe, including
Russia and former republics of the Soviet Union (Figure 14). The diplomacy
of Western European countries as well as their private ﬁrms interests in relo-
cation to low cost countries were very active in this period in both functional
and diplomatic integration, as is clearly visible through the extension east of
the previous core. In both cases, the perspective of enlargement has been a
powerful tool for uniﬁcation with clear eﬀects of anticipation: private ﬁrms
were attracted by the future opening of the borders, while Eastern and Cen-
tral Europe states also reoriented their diplomatic links in order to obtain
the ticket of entry into the EU. In the case of the former republics of the So-
viet Union, many of them remained strongly linked to Russia by their trade
relations but tended at least to develop diplomatic linkages with Western Eu-
rope, at a period where Russia also deepened its linkages with the European
core. The former Yugoslavia was obviously less concerned by the trends be-
cause of the civil war. From this area of strong integration, no major changes
are visible at ﬁrst glance. Some countries previously characterised by func-
tional integration have moved to the group of minimal European inﬂuence
but it concerns only a few countries (Angola, Gabon, Pakistan). The coun-
tries characterised by diplomatic correlation are almost the same if we do
not consider changes in Latin America (exchange of position between Chile
and Argentina).
As a whole, the situation in Europe in the 1990s was characterised by an
extension of the core area east and the relative stability of diplomatic and
functional relations with the rest of the world.
3.4 Shrinking European relations in the world in the con-
temporary period (2005-2008)
Between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, we observed a major shift concern-
ing the EU's inﬂuence in the world. Contrary to the previous period, no
major changes were observed in the limits of the core area characterised by
strong diplomatic and functional links (Figure 15). This core is now clearly
delimited by the Mediterranean Sea to the south and by Turkey and Russia
to the east. But these two countries are not necessarily allied to the EU in
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Figure 14: European world diplomatic and functional linkages in 1995-1998
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Figure 15: European and world diplomatic and functional linkages in 2005-
2008
the future of world competition, even though they are strongly linked to the
EU by air and trade ﬂows and by common diplomatic patterns. Russia has
gained new inﬂuence with the increase in energy prices and it is interested in
building new links toward China and Japan in order to reduce its commer-
cial dependence on the EU. Turkey is more and more tired of the delay of
its adhesion to the EU and is starting to develop a new geopolitical concept
of autonomous core countries, taking beneﬁt of its strategic position. More-
over, these two countries try to balance their relations. The map clearly
demonstrates the erosion of the EU's inﬂuence in Africa, the Middle East
and Southern Asia where major countries are now classiﬁed in the group of
countries poorly linked to the EU in both functional and diplomatic terms
(Nigeria, India, Vietnam, Iran). Even though diplomatic relations are ap-
parently more stable, this erosion of the EU's inﬂuence seems to be a major
issue that is certainly related to many factors such as the closure of external
borders south and the fear of external immigration in ageing societies.
As a whole, the situation in Europe in the 2000s was characterised by
a stabilisation of the core area but a clear decline of its world inﬂuence in
functional terms, especially in Africa, the Middle East and Southern Asia.
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Conclusion
The present analysis of the dynamics of these functional and diplomatic
relations has revealed some interesting discrepancies between the objective
dimension of realities and political dynamic of the enlargement of the EU.
The most striking case is clearly the one of Turkey, which since 1985 has
presented all the signs of an EU member when we consider trade ﬂows,
air ﬂows, embassies network and votes at the UNGA but has not been ad-
mitted to the EU and is always obliged to provide supplementary proof of
its `European-ness'. Even if we cannot neglect the objective reason related
to the acquis communautaire7, it is clear that the explanation of this de-
lay has to be found in other dimensions of reality that are not related to
objective facts but to the more subjective perception of `what is' or `what
should be' Europe. Even when the adhesion of the EU is not directly at
stake, a clear asymmetry can be noted in the perception of southern and
eastern neighbourhoods of the EU, as was well illustrated by the debate be-
tween EU member states when France proposed to launch an `Union for the
Mediterranean'. On one hand, Germany refused the ﬁrst project where only
countries located on the Mediterranean coast were invited to participate,
considering with reason that Northern European countries are also strongly
involved in Northern Africa because of economic or tourist ﬂows. On the
other hand, the new member states of Eastern Europe claimed that a focus
on the Southern neighbourhood should not be a priority and that the EU
should focus on the Eastern dimension toward countries such as the Ukraine.
The foreign minister of Poland declared, for example, that "In Poland we
distinguish between the EU's southern and eastern neighbours: in the south
we have neighbours of Europe, in the east we have European neighbours
of the EU that - if they fulﬁl the criteria - will one day be able to apply
for membership'. This distinction between so-called `European neighbours'
and `neighbours of Europe' is clearly a key component of the perception of
the world by European policymakers, and also probably by citizens. If we
do not take this into account, we cannot understand what is probably the
key explanation of the recent decline in European inﬂuence: the fear of the
stranger and the feeling that Africa is or should be separated from Europe
by a clear border, whatever the price in economic or diplomatic terms.
The mental maps of the undergraduate students that we have collected
in the EuroBroadMap survey provide an exceptional opportunity to evaluate
the importance of mental barriers, especially question C where students were
invited to divide a map of the world into regions. Looking at the borders
drawn by the students, we can evaluate the proportion of students that use
the Mediterranean Sea as a dividing line between Europe and Africa and the
7The acquis communautaire covers a list of requirements in terms of governance, eco-
nomic rules, human rights and so on that are necessary conditions to become an EU
member state.
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proportion of students that include Turkey or Russia in the same region as
the rest of the EU. Furthermore, how many students propose maps without
any divisions and claim the existence of `one world'?
Undergraduate students do not necessarily share the same opinions as
their elders do about the limits of Europe. Even though they have been
strongly inﬂuenced by the same textbooks in which the world is divided
into continents, they have had more opportunities to travel abroad (at the
same ages) and receive more information about the external world by new
channels of communication such as the Internet. The EuroBroadMap survey
also oﬀers the opportunity to benchmark the perception of world regions
elaborated inside and outside the EU. The Mediterranean Sea is not nec-
essarily perceived as a limit with the same frequency in the eyes of French
and Tunisian students. And what are the opinions of Chinese, Brazilian,
Indian or Cameroonian students on the limits of Europe? Do they include
Russia and Turkey or do they limit their `Europe' to the restricted set of
rich countries of Northwestern Europe?
It is not possible to analyse all these dimensions in the current report.
However, it is at least worth proposing some basic elements based on these
preliminary results in order to examine if mental maps ﬁt with the functional
and diplomatic divisions of the world that have been previously discussed
or if they introduce cognitive dissonance between objective and subjective
realities.
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